




**UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT**





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Collection of Works

Edited by George Khutsishvili, Ph.D.

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"The present day shows with appalling clarity how little able people are to let the other man's argument count, although this capacity is a fundamental and indispensable condition for any human community. Everyone who proposes to come to terms with himself must reckon with this basic problem. For, to the degree that he does not admit the validity of the other person, he denies the 'other' within himself the right to exist."

Instead of Introduction: On Refusing to Understand

George Khutsishvili

"The usual pattern seems to be that people give non-violence two weeks to solve their problem... and then decide it has 'failed' Then they go on with violence for the next hundred years... and it seems never to 'fail' and be rejected."

Theodore Roszak

Conflict is a major paradigm for all fields of contemporary social studies. It is a topic whose citation index is among the highest. It is also mass media's daily bread, and a persisting headache for politicians and diplomats. Its definition is a challenge for academics. Its incarnation is often a tragedy comparable to black plague for millions of people worldwide. One will hardly succeed trying to explain them the theories that a "constructive violence" also exists, and that every war eventually accelerates progress. Yet, like it or not, conflict belongs to the few issues that "make the world go round". In our age it also makes the news of the day. "Conflict is a growth industry", assure us conflict experts¹.

The art and science of conflict resolution has already generated the amount of literature comparable to religious. Various handbooks teach us how to avoid, forecast, de-escalate, settle, transform, use, or just live in peace with conflicts. Most people would like to develop these skills, but real-life situations, unlike those in the books, are usually elusive and subjectively disguised, and the tips often disagree. One way to overcome this Babel was sought in creating a comprehensive and well substantiated conflict theory.

What is normally meant by conflict theory in scientific writings, is either its partly or fully formalized version, or even an abstract mathematical theory often derived from, or based on John von Neumann's theory of games, to a limited extent applicable to significant fields of social life, or would rather represent a summarized account of various conceptions pertaining to major types of conflict. Fully comprehensive conflict theory is hardly expectable to emerge, but the already discovered regularities should make for more precise and unified definitions, and more adequate interpretation and use of terms. Still, neither of the existing theories has managed to sufficiently clarify the basic issues that brought them to life, to the extent of making them applicable to people's lives and decision-making.

It is very easy to theoretically imagine the conflict situations relevant to non-zero-sum games where 'win/win' or 'lose/lose' outcomes are possible, but it is extremely hard to upgrade your living to this elementary truth. Why does it happen that judgments and generalizations jeopardize conversation, interpretations enforce "black/white" (binary) thinking, lack of communication creates "enemy", and simple otherness grows into intolerance? Do "true" and "false" pictures of conflict really exist, or can their antagonism be overcome? It turns out that these (already) traditional issues of conflict studies are closely linked with the problems of systems analysis, philosophical logic, political psychology, and other fields of modern academic research. Many of the frequently used terms do not necessarily have to be used on the intuitive basis, as they already have clarified and precise meanings in the relevant fields of theoretical knowledge. Yet there are many others that have to be used in all of their obscurity, or to be proven as empty

signifiers. 'Tender is the night', and 'life is just a walking shadow', but we 'poor players' have to make it signify something.

* * *

Conflict studies are remarkable in comprising both practical and theoretical aspects of the problem. The most reasonable way appears not in seeking a universal formalized version of conflict theory, but in raising the already conceptualized empirical/intuitive knowledge on conflict and related problems to the methodological level of thought, relevantly and correctly engraving theoretical elements, whenever required, into the evolving generalized conception. On the other hand, the already accumulated and conceptualized knowledge on conflict, violence, intolerance, and their perception in human society can significantly upgrade our basic views of human nature, thinking, perception, and communication process.

Another distinctive feature of conflict studies is in their indispensable human dimension. Conflict situations have been studied at interpersonal, inter-group, inter-organizational and international levels², the latter being understood as interstate level (including most wars and violent conflicts that took place before 1990s). The former two appeared interesting mostly to social psychologists, the third to organizational behaviorists/developmentalists, and the fourth to political scientists. It so happened that the type of conflict that was going to become an all-time front-page news and a globally pressing issue since 1980s, had altogether slipped the conflict researchers' attention. These were (inter)ethnic conflicts, often intertwined with other, no less complicated types. This largely happened because of the ideologies of both global political poles which had determined centrality of issues for the bipolar world, and saw the issue of ethnicity in the world processes as dying off and finally doomed. No one could envisage the nationalist boom in the later years, as well as the coming politicization of interethnic intolerance. In view of the sudden and catastrophic collapse of the Soviet empire, it was too easy to start to believe in "the end of history" or the coming "clash of civilizations" . Hopefully, the world is now retrieving from the shock caused by the crush of empires, and a somewhat less apocalyptic vision of remaining and emerging disputes is expectable.

Ethnically and/or religiously induced violent conflicts are frequently understood as outbursts of irrational character. Lacking the power of explanation, such an approach in itself creates a conceptual barrier both to conflict resolution and conflict prevention. As the problem is always practical and painful, the approaches to it, whether rationalized or not, should lead to an implementable solution. Another problem is how to transcend incompatibility of the pictures of conflict on different sides. Again, the easiest but not best way would be to state an impossibility of a unified objective picture of a conflict, which would subjectively justify each of the parties, and maybe even invite them to further escalate the existing intolerance.

Considering all the crises that people have to live through, investigate, instigate or overcome, it becomes obvious that people in most cases cannot really prevent or avoid ethnically induced conflict situations, and the crucial problem is how quickly and efficiently they can get out of them with minimized harm. What makes a fundamental importance in practical applications of any conflict theory is not what a conflict situation (at any stage of its development) is, but what the actors think it is, i.e. the problem of conflict understanding largely depends on the problem of conflict perception. Awareness of a common problem, which in most cases precedes progress in negotiations, does not erode rigidity of the pictures of conflict existing for the actors. One way to deal with this problem is through issue, actor, game rule, or (synergizing) structural transformation of conflict, in the course of public peace process or intervention in 'natural' developments . However, Des Cartes's "Cogito ergo sum" might be a universal motto for resolvers of the intolerance-breeding conflict, this gravest challenge to homo sapiens sapiens.

Towards an Inclusive Interpretation of Conflict

George Khutsishvili

"If the doors of perception were cleansed, everything would appear to man as it is, infinite".

William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

FROM KOAN TO METAOBJECT

One of the twentieth century's most brilliant minds, a Nobel Prize winner in physics Dr. Niels Bohr has solved the wave/particle dilemma in the physics of micro-world by introducing his mind-illuminating complementarity principle, a universal methodological tool for reconciling seemingly incompatible pictures of reality. Suddenly, it was clear that what looked like mutually exclusive and/or incompatible pictures of an object, could be more adequately seen as the complementary pictures of a metaobject. This breakthrough became possible thanks to Dr. Bohr's ability to transcend the conventional limits of a scientific world outlook. Similar processes earlier in the century helped overcome crises in foundations of mathematics and logic (cf. the Goedel's Theorem and metamathematics). They have revealed important aspects of regularities in overcoming major crises of human thinking and understanding, indispensable also while dealing with violent social conflicts, especially those with the issue of ethnicity involved. It turns out we cannot solve any major ethnic, social, or religious conflict without altogether changing, transforming our world outlook, seeing the world from a new perspective, where the problem is rather transcended than decided.

Zen has been one classical way to prevent and totally eliminate conflict mentality by fostering an inclusive, flexible, open and nonviolent worldview. An adept unwittingly transformed his mind while trying to solve a koan, a seemingly meaningless or self-contradictory statement (yet sponsored as significant by the master), and could be even corporally punished for "wrong solutions". The "right solution", however, never came, as solving koan had never been a goal in itself, but represented a problem no more for an enlightened and transformed mind. In this whole process one thing had to be a priori given, and could not be imposed from the outside: it was the commitment of an adept to the process of opening his own mind. A modern conflicting man is rather committed to close his mind from any revelations, and the European-styled rationality, in its turn, often fosters and breeds mind-closures, the same ones which it later tries to uncloset .

How do we learn about a social conflict? We read in a newspaper or a magazine, or watch TV, or just hear someone say that something is happening somewhere. From the very start we learn a biased picture which we tend to believe or not, depending on our own sentiment and credibility of the source. Later we learn about the existence of other pictures of the same conflict, and its perceived complexity grows. The worst, of course, comes if we are (discover ourselves or become) part of the conflict, especially if painful issues of ethnic or religious identity are involved. A methodological model can be offered to rationalize a koan-styled interpretation of conflict - a painful and incomprehensible obstacle you have to transcend on your way to development, even without really understanding how it works, to conflict as metaobject: a kind of reality characterized by higher degree of organization that enables to comprehend an intrinsic

moment of incompatibility through a not-fully-rationalized yet adequate tool integrating all its visions and perspectives into one.

You Better Free Your Mind Instead...

Two thousand years ago Patanjali wrote in his Yoga Aphorisms, "Yoga is restraining the mind-stuff (Chitta) from taking various forms (Vrittis)" (According to Swami Vivekananda, Raja-Yoga, or Conquering the Internal Nature, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1982, p. 115). Something blasphemous to a European thought, until Ludwig Wittgenstein in mid-twentieth century came to the same paradoxical conclusion: you need to stop thinking in order to understand. Apparently, there is something in intrinsic mechanisms of our mind that prevents us from getting to truth, kind of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in action. The classic way to avoid/overcome this obstacle was to achieve completeness of a picture: wholeness seemed a guarantee against misunderstanding.

'Holy', 'whole' and 'healthy' are three words of the same origin. Soul is immortal as it is whole, and "none has the power to destroy the unchangeable" (Srimad Bhagavad Gita, 2.17). Much later, in the 18th century Immanuel Kant's agnosticism will prove that the thought/perceived/imagined picture of the world never comes close to the supposed destination of gnosis. Cumulative knowledge seems all that can be expected from the evolution of scientific thought. "Dissolution pertains to all that is of compound nature. Elaborate thoroughly your own liberation", said reportedly Gautama Buddha to his disciples gathered at his deathbed. Global vision of the essence of things in their perennial and universal oneness should not need mediation of a rational mind. Can pragmatism of social healing tolerate questions that found no rational answers in millennia? Human mind, its nature and basic laws of functioning are still among greatest mysteries: we actually perceive Nature by means of something whose nature remains obscure to us. This paradoxical situation has historically created variety of approaches and chains of misconceptions including the opposition of mysticism and naturalism in understanding our own selves.

It can clearly be shown that thinking is an un-isotropic process: we are conditioned by some forces to think along enigmatic structural guidelines, so that our scope is inevitably restricted, and we finally are within unending yet closed universe (Einstein's cosmological model of the universe may serve as a good illustration here). Rational thought just cannot be unstructured, and a 'closed-circuit' mindset is a natural outcome. (Our minds should feel like Leibnitz's monads, the elementary substances which 'have no windows but reflect the whole universe'). Strange though it may sound, mind-closures are re-enforced in refined forms of intellect: educated modernity is even more prone to eventually block out in domineering, self-sufficient and all-explaining world outlook than primitive types of intellect have been. This vicious circle can be shattered by unexplained phenomena, undecidable questions and intercultural conflicts, and can only be transcended and overcome in the course of global-structural transformation of mind.

The evolutionary approach shows that no reflections on human thought can result in revealing an underlying rigid and unchangeable structural basis, but that the object of reflection is rather determined by a certain system of predispositions, consolidated by a regularized practice of generations. It is not only a set of schemata to which we tend to relate and adjust the empirical data, but which also make us prefer to perceive only the data that fits into them. Ontogenetically we see that a child's flexible and receptive mind is capable of miraculous transformations, which become less and less feasible as (s)he gets aged and educated. We accumulate knowledge, but truly, the farther one travels, the less one knows: otherwise, pre-technological Oriental wisdom would be useless in the 21st century, which is obviously not the case.

To Think or to Understand? The Dilemma of a Rational Mind

"Is there anything in common between the Bosnian crisis and metamathematics? The common point is that you cannot overcome a major crisis without transforming your mind."(G.K.)

Colin Cherry in his classic "On Human Communication" was concerned about such fundamental issues as why it happens that any community splits into warring camps or rivaling teams, like capital and labor, two parties to a violent conflict, two political parties in some democratic countries, or orthodox and heretics in one and the same country. Cherry shows how a choice of predefined distinctive features creates the language quanta for various sets of descriptions used in communication process. Let us say a man A knows a man C but a man B does not know C, and A has to describe C to B using only three parameters, like "height", "weight" and "age", and only within the opposite states, like "tall" or "low" of the height. Under these conditions it is possible to create exactly eight different descriptions of C, where the meaning of each is predetermined by the agreement on the initial parameters (Cherry describes them as "generalized axes of co-ordinates"), along which the discourse may be extended, and to which it also has to be limited.

This might serve as a simple example of how 'the common space' is structured between communicants. Unlike the virtual poor creature C though, who would have to accept the description portraying him like <tall, heavy, old>, to which terms B's perceptive abilities have been limited by definition, we real creatures utilize in the natural process of thinking and communicating such an indefinitely broad variety of parameters that its power, as well as the power of our intellect, seems to us infinitely rich and inexhaustible. Yet, the first thing we notice about this variety is that every single distinctive feature cannot be used or combined with any other (which is reflected in the structure of our language), thus opening up a structured realm of thought and communication. The other thing we notice is that what is compatible, or just comparable for us, is inadmissible or even unimaginable for others, and vice versa.

It had been known at least since Zeno's paradoxes (4th century before Christian era) that binary opposition and dichotomic splitting are important tools, at the same time perpetuating and limiting human thinking and understanding. On the other hand, a structural/descriptive analysis (even in simplest cases like Cherry's example) becomes possible thanks to our ability to somehow feel which of the parameters (features) can be considered together, or applied to one and the same class of objects. Compatibility intuition, present in all natural languages, would turn unrationalizable for humans, as it remains for computers, without a deeply- rooted structural hierarchy existing behind the analyzable process of thought. Socialization, rationalization, conceptualization and standardization of the system of attitudes, judgements and preferences in our mind enhances its structural stability (in evolutionary terms, survivability); yet, this is also what eventually makes it rigid, inflexible and structurally catastrophic. Systems of inter-subjective 'gravity centers' in our mental process create, so to say, the skeleton of human thinking and understanding.

A multitude of all possible combinations of all thinkable features/parameters that may be considered in relation to thinking mind, is how close we intuitively get to the idea of thought-space. This may be seen as an idea of a universal class of all dimensions of thought. The elements of this space are organized in a very complex and largely unexplored way, but in all cases they create a realm that is limited by its structure. Major structures of thought can be pictured as arranged in a hierarchy of layers, each of which pertains to a certain age in its development. Those cannot be seen all together, like in a cross-section of a tree stem, but can be gleaned from documents of the age, and are manifest in living bearers of various cultures and civilizations. Every epoch creates a specific set of modes of thinking by which the epoch is

largely recognizable. Genesis of the structure of thought can only be traced to simpler formations that had determined extensively and intensively the entire diversity of relatively primitive "worlds", but not to the entire reconstructed chain of such.

The reader will probably be reminded here of Thomas Kuhn's very schematic model for the structure of scientific revolutions with periods of 'normal science' determined by 'paradigms' in between. History and methodology of science, however, have so far to a very limited extent managed to reveal the nature of links and driving forces of major transformations in mind. However, in the power-engine of mind's structural development, conflict, as history of dialectics from Heraclitus through Hegel shows, should undoubtedly have played a major part. Suffice it to mention the three great crises in foundations of mathematics caused by (i) Zeno's paradoxes and the Pythagoreans' discoveries of incommensurability of the diagonal and the side in the square, (ii) the intrinsic inconsistency of 'the infinitely small' in Newton-Leibnitz's differential and integral calculi, and (iii) the logical antinomies emerged in Cantor's set theory at the dawn of the twentieth century. In theoretical physics, the 'strange' behavior of micro-particles, inexplicable and contradictory in classical terms, gave rise to modern quantum physics, which has not yet, however, fully outgrown the crisis. In a more practical sphere of politics, a confrontational cold-war mentality of a bipolar world gave an impetus to revolutionary global transformation. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze started in 1980s to speak about a "new political thinking" that should have replaced that mentality in international relations, but they failed to convert the post-totalitarian mentality of collapsing Soviet society before it actually disintegrated into frustrated, antagonistic, and conflicting groups.

Getting back to the structure of mind, the universal organizing principle on the space of dimensions is, unsurprisingly, the tolerance relationship (having its extensional model in Zeeman's reflexive and symmetrical binary relation). Tolerance is a minimum requirement for any two objects to interact, or just coexist without being damaged or transformed, which should not necessarily include subjectivity in understanding this term, or interpreting it in the emotional language of human relationships. General idea of tolerance is closer to that of compatibility, which creates a binary opposition with incompatibility, in its turn closer to antagonism. Tolerance is the least value that can on one scale develop up to identity, and on another up to empathy.

Spielraum, or What is Taboo to Imagine about a Conflict

Social conflict, at least at the initial stages, can be compared to a collision of two trains, neither of which would bother to honk because it is the other train that should disappear before long, for it cannot be real. Group ethnocentrism is usually blamed for distorted perceptions of the parties, but it cannot satisfactorily explain their rigidity. The crucial moment in the socio-cultural world outlooks underlying the expressed positions of the conflicting parties is their consistency, completeness, and self-sufficiency. The kind of consistency in question (similar to pseudo-consistency of the constructions of a paranoid mind) is achieved by purposefully, though not quite consciously limiting perception and filtering information, to maintain the existing issue rigidity and justify preferences made. Completeness and self-sufficiency in the resulting picture of the universe is easily achieved (or, at least, believed in), along with a feeling of "righteousness" which supposedly exalteth a nation, while any different-mindedness is equally righteously demonized.

As a result, a self-justifying mechanism of intolerance is created by the conflict, insurmountable without deep structural and mental transformations in all parties involved. Remarkably, a breakthrough in the public peace process is often made after intolerance is transcended in the

party characterized by higher degree/intensity of intolerance. So far, this process is often seen as basically unmanageable, and irrational to the point of being mystified .

These and similar regularities in conflict development indicate that a basic mindset responsible for them can be described as exclusive interpretation, pertinent not only to conflict but also to many other perceived/reflected phenomena and mental constructions. Violent/high-intensity conflicts radicalize perception and foster binary splits in mentality. Yet, at least at a theoretical level of thinking, it is clear that interpretation of conflict situation is not bound to be exclusive. There is a fifteen-stone garden in Japan, but from whatever point you view it, you see only fourteen stones. What is seen from different angles, is not necessarily two different things (unless you accept a purely phenomenological outlook), and you start to understand only after you realize your perception is bound to be incomplete.

An idea of complete meaning of conflict may be instrumental here: a class of all (quasi-) implications from all possible interpretations of a conflict situation. According to the logic of conflict, meaning is always incomplete because of incompatibilities between implications/interpretations. In these terms, conflict can be defined as a synergic manifestation of incompleteness of factors influencing the dynamic process of social interaction at any given stage (which really means that the process of understanding is potentially infinite). While what is usually called 'conflict' is a temporal cross-section pertaining to high-intensity points in this process. The universe of a given conflict, or *Spielraum*, is related to the conflict situation as perceived by the parties (despite all incompatibilities, parties to conflict have a common *Spielraum*!). What is beyond *Spielraum*, is an indiscriminate realm of what is forbidden to imagine about a conflict, further limited, rationalized and structured as knowledge accumulates. The farther we go in this process, the less we understand; so what is the alternative?

Social reality does not fit into a theoretical cage the mind prepares for it. *Spielraum* may be understood in structural terms as a subspace of 'legitimate' dimensions of thinking/reflecting/understanding, or as a variety of all acceptable rules of game within a given metagame framework. Conflict mentality keeps outside *spielraum* all interpretations, explanations, and predictions which contradict the conclusions and judgements made in *Spielraum* and/or which jeopardize the validity of its structure, thus denying them the right of existence. Tolerant mentality, on the contrary, tries to transform/expand *spielraum*, ideally to coincide with a given thought-space, so as to comprise as wide variety of phenomena as possible. And for an opened/enlightened mind the problem of acceptance/authorization does not exist at all.

On Cultural-Psychological Grounds of Conflict Mentality

Apart from purely methodo(logical) problems arising in the course of conflict analysis, mediation or negotiation, there are problems created by cultural differences stemming from ethnic/cultural identities of the parties to conflict, as well as of the 'third party'. Voices could be heard about relevance/adaptability of Western-bred conflict mediation/resolution techniques to the 'third world' . For an example, in October 1993 an interesting article appeared in *Negotiation Journal* written by Dr. Paul E. Salem, professor of political science at the American University of Beirut. Dr. P.Salem, apparently knowledgeable in nuances of both Western and Eastern mentality and relationships, very efficiently raised the question of relevance of Western conflicts resolution, mediation, facilitation and other techniques to the non-Western societies. Westerners found their approaches and negotiation techniques on a more or less stable and secure system they live in, which they accept and wish to maintain. They automatically assume the fundamental principles underlying the same approaches and techniques should be valid everywhere, and the latter may be applied successfully in the rest of the world. Indeed, how can anyone doubt that peace is better than war, suffering should be stopped, warring parties

separated, and only peaceful solution sought? While in other communities it seems equally right to interpret what is happening in terms of fighting evil, punishing enemy, forcefully restoring historical justice, demanding withdrawal of peace-keeping forces and seeking military solution to the problem. Much of what a Westerner may consider as self-evident, is not such for a post-Soviet or Middle-Easterner. Furthermore, just to what extent Westerners follow in their everyday lives what they are aware of theoretically? Dr. Salem's idea is not to abandon the Western approach entirely, but to keep in mind the mental/cultural/psychological differences while implementing a negotiating methodology.

The very basic problems started to reveal themselves as soon as the Western-bred institutes of mediation and facilitation were introduced to the post-Soviet dispute resolution. It soon became clear that each of the parties to conflict usually sees mediator as someone to be persuaded in rightness of their stand and, this task being successfully achieved, to be used as a kind of 'agent of influence', or otherwise dismiss him/her on the basis of incompetence. Mediator's traditional approach is, the 'pictures' taken as given, to base his/her negotiative tactics on extending his/her mind to comprehend the inner logic of each of them. If (s)he deals with a conflict that has achieved a certain level of gravity and/or intensity, these inner logics must have incompatible moments, insuperable within at least one party's structure of thinking. Mediator, arbitrator, resolver, whoever in between the parties can never afford offering his/her analysis, or assessing positions, or revealing hidden preferences in them without being exposed to severe criticism from at least one of the parties, which would jeopardize or even discard the mediator's credentials with them. (This situation is reminiscent of Eric Berne's transactional analysis where any 'intruder', even a psychotherapist himself, who attempts to reveal the nature of a game in a group meets a fierce protesting reaction from the game initiator.)

Why Should 'We' Talk to 'Them'? Identifying an Uncomfortable Party

Post-Soviet communities in conflict develop their awareness of conflict situation by stages. At every next stage they have to painfully acknowledge counter-productiveness of the steps taken at earlier stages. Can we imagine full awareness achieved at an early stage, which would help prevent the conflict from escalating and getting a violent form? This is often a problem even for a developed democratic civil society which appears to have the tools to cope with it. Remarkably, the same is hardly possible in emerging democracies where immature mass consciousness prevails over advanced individuals' vision, and is more feasible in authoritarian systems where public sentiment is restrained by a ruling group's policy.

In a sufficiently intensive social conflict each of the parties would be happy to solve the problem without negotiations entirely: the truth is on our side, 'God is with us', so let the other party realize their faults and accept the offered terms of agreement. Soon it is clear that the other side feels exactly the same way, and is determined and able to endure the confrontation. So negotiations are inevitable; yet it is good to have a strong mediator on your side, hard bargaining seems a bottom-line tactics, and any compromise looks like a betrayal of your own cause and people who have suffered for that cause. There is a major temptation to attribute all the failures and obstacles to a covert support of 'the other party' from 'the third force' (which may partly be true, but is usually globalized; apparently it looks like a shifted locus of control). Perception of the conflict situation as a 'zero-sum game' persists in the parties for a long time, and compromised agreements are thus perceived as imposed from hostile 'third' power(s) rather than elaborated as a rational choice.

Similarly, in a sufficiently intensive social conflict each of the parties would be happy to call the other party the name it feels the other deserves. Soon it is clear that under that name there will be

no negotiations. In the meanwhile, mediating parties and international environment have already pragmatically started to use for all parties to conflict the names they chose for themselves. Outsiders are, of course, suspected of being partial, to say the least, and the dispute starts in the community on whether to temporarily accept, at least operationally, the denotation of the other party proposed by itself (which most probably involves the sought status), in order not to ruin negotiating process. Negotiations proper, as well as all relevant diplomatic transactions develop in a very different way from their media coverage and comments on both sides which try to maintain the radicalized state of public opinion.

Equalizing Positions in Rights while Negotiating a Solution

Traditional approach had been based on trying to pick, or point out the only true, or "right" description of the conflict situation. For an interested party, it is often a painful discovery that none of the alternative pictures of the same conflict (expressed in the essential positions of the parties) should need the right of existence, as they already exist. What is more difficult to believe is that each of the pictures is, in its own way, true. In an interpersonal, or even an inter-group conflict we can hardly exclude the probability of one, or all pictures of the conflict to be erroneous, based on false premises, mistaken perceptions or calculations, and thus correctable. In a social, ethnic or international conflict each picture/position is substantiated to the extent that it becomes part of the identity of any individual in the conflicting party, and any mediator which ignores or disregards validity of one picture to the other's favor, is doomed as a professional.

In all cases, a conflict situation primarily assumes the form of a more or less consistent description of events. Expressed positions of the parties to conflict, along with the pertinent historical pictures, make basic scripts, and the 'third party' understanding of events should create a metascript, as it reflects over the principles underlying the basic scripts. Various versions of history of conflict, combined with scenarios of its development, make possible scripts. Attitudes, value systems and preferences of the social environment in which the conflict develops, induce the (possible) contexts in which the scripts may be considered.

First of all, we have to get rid of the incompatibility which is inevitably present: otherwise, we are not dealing with real conflict but rather with misunderstanding in terms. The methodological principle of equality of rights for the conflict pictures/positions does not mean that one picture/position cannot be more substantiated or justified than the other. It only means that a negotiation and mediation process based on a preference between the positions of the parties in an inter-communal or interethnic conflict cannot succeed in principle. We of course stumble at an old philosophical dilemma: how can there exist two different or even mutually exclusive yet true pictures of the same phenomenon or situation? Whatever epistemologically may the answer be, any successful (mediated or self-cured) negotiating process should incorporate the following stages: (a) acceptance of the positions and identification of the parties to conflict as they are (no criticism or corrections!); (b) comparative analysis of the positions of the parties to conflict, picking out and discriminating their compatible and incompatible points; (c) transformation of the existing conflict mentality into an inclusive and reconciled vision; (d) upgrading of the conflict pictures generated by the parties to a unified meta-picture, dwelling on compatible or joint interests, values, problems, goals, and finally transcending incompatibility.

Instead of Epilogue

"Truth is lived, not taught. Be prepared for conflicts..."
Hermann Hesse, Das Glasperlenspiel

If I try to characterize in one word the goal of this essay, it is more religious than theoretical. And if so, why do we have to pass through all these stages at all? Why cannot people start from what has already been discovered as the final truth, and avoid painful discoveries often costing them their lifetime, and sometimes, their lives? The answer is obvious: because that is how we are, that is the path we have to go through, some rapidly, some slowly and painfully, and some never. The path to enlightenment does exist, and tolerance is just an interim state on the way to it. That is exactly why we need to develop techniques to make this transition available for all while we are still active.

The danger exists though that the issues raised in this article may look even more complicated now, instead of being clarified. Yet, let us not forget that the solution is in ourselves, or better, in our souls. The Western thought has always been oriented toward cumulative knowledge of the external reality, the inner world being a secondary issue needed primarily for clearing up the subject/object and stimulus/reaction relationships. The Eastern thought was primarily concentrated on the essential unity of being, of which man's external and internal worlds were secondary and/or complementary sides. A sufficient basis for understanding may be created only in combination of these approaches, enabling us to come back to our common loving home: a peaceful world.

Notes:

(A note to the Notes: Numeration starts from Introduction and continues through the article)

1. Fisher R., Kopelman E. and Kupfer Schneider A., *Beyond Machiavelli (Tools for Coping with Conflict)*, Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1994, p.1.
2. Deutsch, Morton, *Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences*, in Vayrynen R. (ed), *New Directions in Conflict Theory (Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation)*, London: SAGE Publications, 1992, p.26.
3. The term belongs to Francis Fukuyama. His paper caused lots of discussions at the time when collapse of the Soviet empire was a breaking news, but looks quite irrelevant and odd from the modern perspective.
4. The term belongs to Samuel Huntington, and was first used in his article "The Clash of Civilizations?" published in the summer of 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.
5. See Vayrynen, Raimo, "To Settle or to Transform?", in Vayrynen R. (ed), *ibid.*, pp. 1-7.
6. A brilliant account of foundational crises can be found in S.C. Cleene's *Introduction to Metamathematics* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1952), and in A. Fraenkel and I. Bar-Hillel's *Foundations of Set Theory* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1958).
7. On mind closures and the structural models/types of mentality see in Khutsishvili, George, *Genesis of the Structure of Theoretical Thinking*, Tbilisi: Academic Press, 1989 (in Russian; English Summary).
8. Back in 1995 Ramazan Abdulatipov, then deputy-chairman of the Russian Parliament, desperately commented on his recent trip to his native North-Caucasus region to mediate North-

Osset - Ingush dispute, that the pictures of conflict on either side seem irreconcilable, and an objective information about the ethnic conflict cannot exist (Broadcast by Russian ORT TV channel).

9. Since then, several authors have covered various aspects of cultural influences on conflict development and resolution: apart from Morton Deutsch's abovementioned article, cf. Cohen, Raymond, *Negotiating Across Cultures (Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy)*, Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1991; Faure, Guy Olivier and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (eds), *Culture and Negotiation (The Resolution of Water Disputes)*, London: SAGE Publications, 1993; Tannen, Deborah, *You Just Don't Understand (Women and Men in Conversation)*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1990; et al. None of them may be seen though as directly or satisfactorily touching upon relationship between conflict resolution and cultural/mentality problems influenced by ethnic/cultural/civilizational differences.

See Berne, Eric, *Games People Play (The Psychology of Human Relationships)*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1981 and his subsequent works in transactional analysis.

Role Playing as a Cultural Projection

by Dr. George Nizharadze

The International Center on Conflict and Negotiation, funded by Norwegian Refugee Council, is implementing a one year training programme in conflict resolution. Training is delivered to those social groups that often encounter conflict situations (IDPs, journalists, military, police, staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and state apparatus staff). The training programme employs the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), an American method, part of which involves role playing. In course of role playing the training sub groups, consisting of 3 or 4 people, have to invent an imaginary conflict situation and assign roles to its participants. Role playing takes place on the first day of training which means that the knowledge acquired during the training has no effect on it.

A team of psychologists participating in the programme found it interesting to subject the cases of role playing to analysis. The substantial material obtained shows even at the first sight, that simulated imaginary conflict situations present an informative, even though incomplete projection of the state of modern Georgian society. Besides, the material serves as a good illustration for some basic peculiarities characteristic of the Georgian culture.

So far 53 imaginary situations have been simulated in course of training. All of them have been video taped. Each conflict situation has been analysed using the following parameters: 1) location of conflict (street, family, etc.); 2) time (present, future, past); 3) content of conflict (family disagreement, work related conflict, etc.); 4) participants.

Analysis

Before going to the analysis of the obtained material, several basic peculiarities of Georgian culture should be mentioned in the first place. In general, one of the basic features of the culture is individualism-collectivism. Georgia is a collectivist culture oriented on small groups (family, relatives, friends, neighbours). In this respect it is different from Russia which is a public-collectivist country oriented on large groups, like nation, "people", etc.

Another peculiarity of Georgian culture is that in spite of the existence of numerous small groups

in it, group values and norms are quite similar to each other. In other words, small groups existing in Georgia reveal relatively minor differences in both vertical (upper and lower strata of the society) and horizontal (town-country, other regions) dimensions.

Finally, due to the fact that small group orientation in Georgia has an exaggerated character, an individual's interests are limited to small reference groups and the development of a broad perspective, imagination or creativity almost never takes place. To be more exact, the basic structure of Georgian social life does not promote the development of mentioned qualities.

The analysed material perfectly illustrates the peculiarities listed above.

Only 2 out of 53 simulated situations revealed the detachment from the routine patterns. In one of the situations simulated by working team members in course of the preparation of the programme, the action was taking place in a European kingdom. The participants were an old king and his three children. The essence of conflict was disagreement about the candidates for the throne. The plot was naturally simulated by common themes taken from cinema and fiction.

The most original plot was created by a young team including IDPs. The action was taking place on an imaginary planet inhabited with "persimmonists". The conflict consisted in the following: several characters urgently needed to bring (for different purposes) persimmons from a distant place but there was not enough transport to accommodate all the interested people. The situation was full of enthusiasm, honour and imagination. However, it should be secondary mentioned that the situation was dominated by one of the participants, a very critical person, who was the author of all the original components. The other participants confined themselves to secondary roles.

Another situation observed during the training can be also regarded, with some reservations, as a "detachment from routine". It bore a purely "cinematographic" character and consisted in the division of the spheres of influence among Mafia groupings, or, simply, in the disputes on the "street rules".

In the rest of 50 role situations, participants simulated typical, daily conflicts. They often played the role of themselves. For instance, out of the three groups including representatives of the road police, two groups simulated one and the same situation. The road police stops a car and accuses the driver of the violation of traffic regulations (one driver is accused of driving despite the red light; the other driver gets the blame because of being supposedly drunk). It is interesting to note, that the plot invented by the group was always the same and was only changed as a result of suggestion made by the facilitator.

As for the IDP groups, constituting the majority, situations simulated by them rarely went beyond the immediate problems facing internally displaced people. The IDPs played either the role of themselves or the role of "a refugee person in Tbilisi". The action usually took place in humanitarian aid offices, refugee committee, at the market. etc. The tension between IDPs and Tbilisi residents was often emphasised (local people from Tbilisi telling IDPs that they are "Mingrelians", "dirty", and as on or authorities do not recognise IDP's rights). This is obviously a very important problem which should be approached and investigated as soon as possible.

It is remarkable that only two situations were dedicated to the Abkhazian issue itself. One case addressed violent and nonviolent ways of conflict resolution. The other situation involved "Georgians" and "Abkhazians" (before the war) putting forward mutual claims. The explanation for the rarity of the mentioned topic could be the following: To IDPs present social status creates a more important problem than their return to the places they come from. However, some other

factors should not be ruled out either. Firstly, in the introductory speech the facilitator emphasised that the training is dedicated not to the Abkhazian conflict but to the alternative ways of conflict resolution, applicable to conflict general. Secondly, the position of IDPs with regard to the Abkhazian conflict is not psychologically clear. The conflict relationships with the Abkhazians that took place before the war are experienced as something painful. At the same time, their future relationships and future social rules are ambiguous at this stage. For the reason they avoid the simulation of situations related to the Abkhazian conflict.

The most frequent conflict situation is referred to family conflicts (conflicts between husband and wife; parents and children, where the children demand more freedom and the parents more obedience: the conflict between the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law or the son-in-law and the mother-in-law is another illustration of tension typical of this kind of relationship). All above points to the fact that family presents the basic locus for the Georgian society, the center of social communication and at the same time the source of the most important conflicts. The above could be related to the lack of public behaviour skills definitely observed in the Georgian society.

It is worth mentioning that not a single plot addressed vocational activity (the traffic police were exceptional in the respect, but what we are dealing with here is just an amusing incident). This point to the fact that job is matter of secondary importance in the Georgian social life.

It is also remarkable that in the plots addressing family conflicts women often played the leading part. This, to a certain extent, supports the point of view according to which the Georgian culture seems to bear masculine traits but actually it is a woman who plays the part of a decision maker.*

Finally, the analysed role situations illustrate another feature characteristic of the Georgian society. Empirical research shows* that the identification with one's own gender, with the sexual role (man, wife, brother, mother, etc.) is strongly manifested in the Georgian culture. This should be the reason for the fact that out of about 200 people participating in role playing only three people "changed their gender", i.e a man played the role of a female and vice versa.

* G. Nizharadze, Polemical Comments on Some Socio-Psychological Peculiarities of Georgian Culture. In "Wit from Misfortune" (Editor G. Nodia). Tbilisi: CIPDD, 1994.

* Z. Mkheidze, G. Nizharadze. Verbal Determinants of Interpersonal Conflicts in Georgian Society. Tbilisi: ICCN, 1996.

Multi-parameter Social and Psychological Research of Groups of the Internally Displaced Persons and Tbilisi Residents

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Pre-observations

In 1996-97 a non-governmental organization, the International Conflict and Negotiation Centre implemented the project "Program for Conflict Resolution Training in Georgia" (sponsor – the Norwegian Refugees Council). The group of socio-psychologists participated in the project parallel with performance of other functions, carried out the research work. The present article shows the results of one such research.

The goal of our research was the multi-parameter study of opinion of the internally displaced persons (IDP) and Tbilisi residents in order to establish, on one side, the general tendencies of the modern Georgian culture, and on the other side, to reveal differences between IDPs and Tbilisi residents as well as those ones between the sexes.

Methods

There were applied groups of tests including 9 scales:

1. **Locus of Control Scale**: The short Roter's test of 15 questions approved in twocross-culture researches was applied (Goodwin, et al, 1997, Nizharadze, Berekashvili, 1996). Variants of answer: do not agree completely; do not agree; hard to answer; agree; completely agree.

2. **Temporal Locus Scale**: This 9-question scale appraises the orientation at the past, the present and future. Examples of questions:

- people were more moral in the past;
- we are to live by today, for the future is uncertain;
- the science will have ability to solve all problems arising before the mankind.

3. **Modernity Scale**: The scale (7 questions) appraises the level of sharing of modern humane and democratic values (Jahoda, 1990).

for example:

- a non-pious man may be a good person;
- sometimes an uneducational person may guide the country better.

Variants of answers are the same.

1. **Anxiety Scale**. Includes 12 questions (Ahmedjanov, 1995).

Variants of answers: Yes, No.

2. **Lie Scale**. Includes 10 questions (Ahmejanov, 1995).

Was added to the previous questionnaire.

Variants of answers are: Yes, No.

3. **Parent-Children Relations Scale**. This 6-question scale (Nizharadze, Berekashvili, 1996) appraises two modes of relations with children: a) symbiotic – when a child is considered as a part of the parent; b) sovereign – when a parent sees an independent individual in the child. For example:

- parents shall always know where is a child and what is he/she doing.
- young family shall live separately.

The variants of answer are the same as in the first three scales.

1. **Social Distance Scale (Bogardus Scale)**. A respondent shall answer what kind of relationship he/she agrees to establish (to marry, to make friends, to have as a member of the family, to make neighbors, to cooperate, no relations at all, I'd expel he/she from my country) with representatives of 6 nationalities (Russian, Abkhazian, Armenian, American, Italian, Ossetian).
2. **Conflict Resolution Style Scale**. Respondents have to choose one in 30 pairs of provisions each (Ahmejanov, 1995, 174-177). The scale appraises the inclination to 5 possible modes (keeping distance, adaptation, compromise, competition, cooperation).
3. **Individualism-Collectivism Scale**. From 13 questions 6 questions appraises collectivism and 7 – individualism (Hus, 1988)

For example:

- when on work the main thing for me is the friendly group of collaborators;
- I like big cities where nobody knows each other.

Variants of answer are the same as in the first three scales.

Respondents

It was important to us that the groups of Tbilisi residents and IDP differed from each other by one feature only, so we decided to questionnaire the students. 216 students in total took part in the questionnaire, 106 internally displaced persons and 116 Tbilisi residents (Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi Teacher's University named after Sul Khan-Saba Orbeliani, Sukhumi State University), where 116 were men, and 110 - women, age rate – 17-25.

Hypotheses

a) IDP - Tbilisi residents

1. **Anxiety**. We considered that anxiety level would be higher in the IDP group. The grounds for such hypothesis is reasonable: forcible isolation from the native surrounding, finding themselves in a comparable strange surrounding disorder in life, etc.

Some other hypotheses are related to the previous hypothesis.

2. **Control Locus**. We assumed that IDP group would show more externality, firstly, for the higher anxiety level, and, secondly, for the fact that urban surrounding determines more internality.

3. **Individualism-Collectivism**. We expected the higher index of collectivism in IDP group for the same reasons (anxiety, urban surrounding) as well.

4. **Temporal Locus**. We expected the more orientation at the past and future in IDP group, and - at the present in Tbilisi residents.

5. **Modernity**. We expected the higher index of this scale in Tbilisi residents group.

6. **Lie scale**. We expected high index in the both groups for we consider that the hysteroidal

impulsiveness (tendency to show yourself more positive more emotional, in the public surrounding, than you are actually) is one of the basic feature of the Georgian culture. In addition, for the latter circumstances, we did not expect many and high correlation with other scales. We also considered it possible that this index will be a small higher in IDP group.

7. **Parent-Children Relations Mode.** Here we've also considered that the symbiotic relations between parents and children are the basic peculiarity of the Georgian culture and expected the high index in the both groups, a small higher one in IDP group.

8. **Social Distance.** We expected more toleration in the Tbilisi residents groups.

9. **Conflict Resolution Mode.** Here we expected modes oriented at the relations, especially the prevailed adaptation mode.

b) Men - Women.

1. **Anxiety.** It's known that the anxiety level is higher in men. We expected the similar result.

2. **Control Locus.** No preliminary assumption.

3. **Individualism-Collectivism.** With respect to the common opinion, we expected the higher level of collectivism in women.

4. **Temporal Locus.** We expected that women are more oriented at the past.

5. **Modernity.** No preliminary hypothesis.

6. **Lie scale.** We expected no significant difference between those two groups, may be a bit more hysteroidal impulsiveness in women.

7. **Parent-Children Relation Mode.** Here we expected the same or the similar index, or a bit higher one in women.

8. **Social Distance.** No preliminary assumption.

9. **Conflict Resolution Mode.** With respect to the common opinion, we expected that men should be more oriented at competition.

Results and Their Analysis

The data were processed by the SPSS7.0 software

a) General Results

1. **Lie Scale.** We've got a rather high index at this scale. The average lie coefficient appeared to be 48.4%. It used to be that when in a separate questionnaire the lie index exceeds 40%, the answers shall be deemed as unreliable and the questionnaire is null and void. As to our event, at formal point of view, the majority of questionnaires should be annulled but we expected such results, for, as we mentioned above, the hysteroidal impulsiveness one of the basic peculiarity of Georgian culture.

More detailed: the main unit in the Georgian culture is a small group (of relatives, friends,

neighbors, etc.) the members of which know each other in person. In such groups there exists the behavior standard system that, incidentally, doesn't differ from that one in another small group. In this case the fact that those standards often do not coincide with the abstract values and norms belonging to the public sphere is of more importance for use. As a rule, norms of the group are put on a higher step than the public norms (theft is bad in general, but if one of my people has stolen something, I shall do all my best for he avoids the punishment). For this peculiarity in Georgian reality within the process of socialization there are developed, in the first turn, the skills of interpersonal relations, and the public behavior skills are acquired less. Thus, when finding himself in the public (for example, before the TV camera) a mean Georgian feels a rather strong anxiety and, as a rule, applies to the cliches, or expresses loyalty to the public values (homeland, law, dignity and such like) which he may not share at the behavior level (McFarland et al, 1992). Filling in of an anonymous sociological questionnaire or psychological test belongs to the public behavior (for the lack of feedback object of social comparison (Festinger, 1954). In such situation the big part of Georgian respondents unconsciously chooses such answers that, at their opinion, will represent them in a better way (no rumoring, no being late and such like). For the high level of hysteroidal impulsiveness we shall apply to the results of questionnaire carried out in Georgian population with care, and this circumstance shall be taken into consideration within the discussion of the general results of our research. The best possibility of revealing the hysteroidal impulsiveness in our questionnaire are the temporal locus, modernity, control locus scales, because the questions related to the public values are often met there. At the same time, its rather possible to compare the different groups in one Georgian option according to the sex, age, social and other feature, or what our research was aimed at.

2. **Individualism-Collectivism.** The collectivism index in the option, as it was expected, is high – 24.3 in average of 30 possible. Noteworthy is that the individualism index is not low as well – 21.4 in average of 35 possible. The most noteworthy is that those two parameters did not show any significant correlation with each other. This result corroborates the assumption of Schwarz according to whom the individualism and collectivism are not the two poles of one continuum but are to be considered as two independent parameters.

3. **Temporal Locus.** Index of orientation at the future has appreciably exceeded the indices of orientation at the present and the past (accordingly: 10.6; 8.7; 8.6). This result is of interest because orientation at the present and the past is more typical for the modern Georgian culture. May be the age of our respondents played a certain role in this fact because the youth is more oriented at the future. The effect of hysteroidal impulsiveness is not excluded as well (see, the heading "Lie Scale"). The matter requires additional study.

Noteworthy also is that orientation at the future proved to be in a reliable correlation with the orientation at the past: 0.30; $p=0.01$.

4. **Conflict Resolution Mode.** Our hypothesis has completely come true: the results obtained at this scale prove one of the basic peculiarity of the Georgian culture – priority of interpersonal relations in comparison with the business interests. Our respondents grant priority to those forms where accent is made on the positive relationship (see Table 1):

Table 1

Behavior mode	Average
Keeping distance	6.44
Adaptation	9.23
Compromise	4.88
Cooperation	6.41

Competition	4.03
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Table 2 shows correlation among the different modes of behavior (only reliable indices are given):

Table 2

	Keeping distance	Adaptation	Compromise	Cooperation	Competition
Keeping distance				-0.177**	-0.524**
Adaptation			-0.216**		-0.366**
Compromise		-0.216**			-0.499**
Cooperation	-0.177**				-0.317**
Competition	-0.524**	-0.366**	-0.499**	-0.317**	

** p=0.01

Table 3 shows the reliable correlation of modes of behavior with the main scales:

Table 3

	Orientation at the present	Orientation at the past	Orientation at the future	Anxiety	Lie	Collectivism	Individualism	Modernity	Control locus	Parents children
Keep. distance										0.177**
Adapt.	-0.145*	0.136*					0.162*			
Compromise							-0.142*	0.162*		
Cooper.										
Competition.		-0.135*						-0.138*		

* p=0.05; **p=0.01.

Noteworthy is the correlation between the anxiety and orientation at the compromise in conflicts as well as the correlation between the symbiotic mode and keeping distance mode in conflicts that may become the subject of the more extended research.

Noteworthy is the positive correlation of modernity and cooperation and the negative correlation of modernity and competition, though, as a rule, the both shall be in positive correlation, for competition and cooperation are the Western democratic values. This proves our assumption that the Georgian public is oriented more at the relationship than at the business, therefore, to be a modern person for a Georgian means to be more oriented at the cooperation, but not competition,

as they believe that the competitive relations are not admissible for their too personal and emotional meaning.

5. **Social Distance.** Results obtained at this scale proved to be interest in many aspects. The first is that the decreasing sequence of relations (to marry; to make friends; make a member of the family; make neighbors; to cooperate; no relations; to expel from my country) applied in the original test has not proved to be adequate for the Georgian option. The significant part of respondents (24.6%) agreed to make friends, cooperate or marry a representative of this or that nationality, but refused to admit him/her as a member of the family, or make neighbors with him/her. In our opinion this paradox may be accounted for, if we assume that such social groups as a big family and neighbors, in one side, and friends and collaborators, in the other side, perform the different functions in the Georgian culture. The family and neighborhood may be considered, in a certain view, as formal groups, or such groups the members of which do not effect on their composition and, concurrently, are to obey the norms of behavior accepted in those groups. In return, an individual chooses the friends and neighbors circle by himself (as to the latter group we shall keep in mind that in the Georgian culture the accent is made, in the first turn, on relations at the work, and in the second turn only, on the business interests (see the results of conflicts scale), and from this aspect those groups may be considered as a shelter from the formal relations. Therefore, the groups given in the scale create to the Georgian option not the equally decreasing turn (according to the subject value) but two different classes of social groups. Thus, the obtained results may be explained by a will of influence over the composition of formal groups. As to a married couple, it is a less formal group for young people. It may be assumed that for the elder individuals such kind of relations obtains the more formal nuance.

The second result is not of less interest. 37.5 % of the respondents gave us the irrational, at the first sight, answers. They agreed to establish positive relations of a certain kind with a representative of this or that nationality, and concurrently, mentioned "no relations at all" or "I'd expel him/her from my country. On the experimenter's question how did those answers coincide with each other, the respondents told that there was no error, for they agreed to establish positive relations with certain representatives of the given nationality (including, the marriage), but they did not wish, in general, that other nationalities (or representatives of concrete nationalities) would live in Georgia. Here the conflict between the levels of "small groups" and the public in the social life arises again - a concrete representative of the foreign nation is admissible as a member of the concrete small referential group, but, in general, the attitude to a foreign nation is negative (here we may remind the French writer Pierre Daninnos' ironical remark: in general, the French consider themselves as anti-Semites, bur each of them has got at least one Hebrew friend (Daninnos, 1971). Average indices of social distance to certain nations are s shown in Table 4 (range of variation is from -6 up to +15).

Table 4

Nationality	Russian	Abkhazian	Armenian	American	Italian	Ossetian
Average	5.66	0.74	0.89	8.30	10.23	0.62

In the first turn, the expressed sympathy to the Italians attracts attention. It may be explained by a real or illusory likeness of Italian and Georgian cultures and anthropological types. Especially noteworthy is that attribution to the Ossetians is a bit more negative than to the Abkhazians. We abstain from the interpretation of this result before the further study of the matter.

Table 5 gives correlation in the social distance (all indices are reliable, $p=0.01$).

Table 5

	Russian	Abkhazian	Armenian	American	Italian	Ossetian
Russian	X	0.477	0.507	0.421	0.299	0.466
Abkhazian	0.477	X	0.698	0.353	0.287	0.769
Armenian	0.507	0.698	X	0.457	0.325	0.706
American	0.421	0.353	0.457	X	0.524	0.364
Italian	0.299	0.287	0.325	0.524	X	0.256
Ossetian	0.466	0.769	0.706	0.364	0.256	X

Correlation in the main scales.

Our past experience of the multi-parameter researches of the Georgian option has shown us that the correlation in the separate scales is mainly poor, and, often, paradoxical (Nizharadze, Berekashvili, 1996). The same picture is revealed in the given cases.

Table 6 shows reliable correlation in the main sales.

Table 6

	Orien- tation at the present	Orien- tation at the past	Orien- tation at the future	Anxiety	Lie	Collec- tivism	Indivi- dualism	Modernity	Control Locus	Parents Children
Orien- tation at the present	X	0.298**								
Orien- tation at the past	0.298**	X						-0.158*		0.239**
Orien- tation at the future			X			0.199**	-0.134*	0.166*		
Anxiety				X					- .0155*	
Lie					X					0.138*
Collec- tivism			0.199**			X				0.241**
Indivi- dualism			-0.134*				X	-0.139*		
Modernity		-0.158*	0.166*				-0.139*	X		-0.171*
Control Locus				-0.155*					X	
Parents Children		0.239**			0.138*	0.241**		-0.171		X

*p=0.05; **p=0.01.

As we see, no index reaches 0.3. At the same time, the paradoxical correlation is to be found: negative correlation - between the modernity and individualism as well as between the latter and orientation at the future; positive correlation - between the orientation at the future and collectivism. In addition, noteworthy is the zero correlation between the control locus and individualism. At our opinion, it shall be also related to the high level of the hysteroidal impulsiveness.

We may also assume that the Georgian idea of individualism does not coincide with the Western idea of individualism and, partially, contradicts it; orientation at the future is more connected for the Georgians with the collective but not individual diligence and responsibility.

IDP- Tbilisi Residents

a) Anxiety

The result at this scale was completely unexpected. The Tbilisi residents have shown a higher anxiety level (in average: Tbilisi residents - 6.64; IDP - 6.04; difference is reliable, $p=0.05$). Thus, our hypothesis has not been proved and the results requires interpretation. As we may suppose, here we've met with the same phenomenon as was fixed within the I World War. It is known that in the war time there were a very few cases of psychosomatic and neurotic diseases, or, in other words, the diseases caused by the stress (stomach ulcer and other such) in population. It s explained by the reason that the people had obtained the expressed am to survive and mobilised all their moral resources for attaining to this goal and the grave living problems did not have the stressogenic effect. In return, after the end of war, there was indicated the sudden growth in the said diseases. We may assume that in our case the dominant of IDP's mental life at the given stage is the expressed goal to come back to their homeland or to obtain the social status in the new surrounding. In addition, we may also assume that having overcome their former difficulties IDPs have hardened themselves and became psychologically more resistant against the living troubles.

b) Control Locus.

Our hypothesis has not been proved at this scale as well, no reliable difference is indicated.

c) Individualism-Collectivism

Here collectivism of IDPs shows a significantly higher level (In average: Tbilisi residents -23.43; IDP -25.12; $p=0.001$). This difference is not determined by the anxiety level as we have assumed. We may guess that the decisive effect on this parameter obtains the socialisation surrounding (Marshall, 1997). Therefore, our hypothesis has been partially proved. Noteworthy is that at the same time no difference is pointed in the individualism that is one more argument for that fact that the individualism and collectivism are not alternative parameters.

d) Temporal Locus

Our hypothesis regarding this scale has been proved [partially only. IDP group has revealed the reliably higher orientation at the past and future)IDP 8.93 and 10.86 accordingly; Tbilisi residents - 8,20 and 10.27; $p=0.05$). Differences are understandable and require no comments. As to the orientation at the present, no reliable difference has been revealed.

e) Modernity.

The hypothesis has not been proved - no differences revealed.

f) **Lie scale**

Here our hypothesis has been proved without any doubt, the common level of hysteroidal impulsiveness has been very high (IDP-5.11; Tbilisi residents - 4.48; $p=0.02$).

g) **Parents-Children Relations Mode**

The hypothesis has been proved, IDPs have shown the reliably high symbiotic ability (DP - 17.46, Tbilisi residents - 15.26; $p=0.01$).

h) **Social distance**

The hypothesis has been proved. The Tbilisi residents revealed more tolerability to all nationalities and, accordingly, less social distance. The differences are given in Table 7 ($p=0.01$).

Table 7

	Russian	Abkhazian	Armenian	American	Italian	Ossetian
IDP	4.61	-0.92	-0.78	7.27	9.38	-0.52
Tbilisi residents	6.90	2.34	2.50	9.28	11.05	1.72

In the results of Tbilisi residents noteworthy is the more positive attitude to the Abkhazians as compared with the Ossetians. This was the reason that the Abkhazians have got the higher rating in total. We reserve interpretation here, too.

i) **Conflict Resolution Mode**

Only one difference has been revealed at this scale; the Tbilisi residents reliably more often show orientation at compromise. (Tbilisi residents -5.15; IDP - 4.61; $p=0.05$).

Men-Women

a) **Anxiety**

The anxiety scale regarding the sex has given us the completely unexpected result; women have revealed reliably higher level of anxiety (men - 5.60; women - 7.20; $p=0.01$). It is well known that men are less resistant to the stressogenic factors. This is one of the reasons that the average duration of man's life is less. The possible explanation of this paradoxical result obtained in the Georgian option may be located as well between the public and small-group angles in the conflict, in particular, in the sexual aspect. There two points shall be stipulated; one is the young age of our respondents and the second is the latest changes that took place in the public life of Georgia, namely, removal of taboo on the subjects connected with the sex in the public sphere. At the same time, quite another situations a small-group, particular, family surrounding. The said taboo is still effective in those groups. Besides, here prevails the traditional, strictly negative attitude to any kind of manifestation of the woman's sexuality. Here we have the conflict: in one side, the informational flow connected with the sex provided via mass media (TV, press, literature) and relevant temptations, and in the other side, traditional moral stereotypes which are more severe against women. At our opinion, the result obtained in the research shall be attributed

to this psychological conflict. Such interpretation requires examination in other age groups through the similar research.

b) Individualism-Collectivism.

The collectivism scale has not given any difference but the individualism index among women was reliably higher (men – 20,93; women – 21.90; $p=0.5$). This result was unexpected for in all cultures men are distinguished by more individualism (Hofstede, 1980).

Our result at this scale (as the higher level of anxiety among women) may be explained in such way that in Georgia, in particular, lately, the burden of resolution of the family vital problems is mainly borne by women and hat implies more responsibility and personal involvement.

c) Conflict Resolution Mode.

Four parameters from 5 at this scale have give us the reliable difference (see Table 8).

Table 8

	Keeping distance	Adaptation	Cooperation	Competition
Males	6.20	9.03	6.22	4.72
Females	6.71	9.47	6.63	3.23
Reliability	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01

The result is understandable and logical – women are more gentle, the competition mode is more typical for men, but against this background the higher index of individualism among the Georgian women and the same level of collectivism between the men and women is rather strange. The reliable difference between the sexes at other scales and subscales has not been revealed.

CONCLUSION

Our research gave us some interesting data and determined prospects of our further work. Our interpretation of two unexpected results obtained at the anxiety scale (the higher level of anxiety among the Tbilisi residents and women, as compared with IDPs and men, accordingly) requires the empiric examination and elaboration. The further research of individualism and collectivism in the Georgian culture will be defined. Study of this matter requires elaboration of a wider spectrum of methods and specification of the concepts. We consider that "small-group" and public types of collectivism shall be differentiated (Triandis, 1989). It has not been done yet by the empiric methods.

At our opinion, the most interesting result shall be considered the empiric manifestation of significant peculiarities typical for our present public. Here we imply the conflict between the "small-group" and public spheres of social life. This conflict is reflected in the Georgian culture in many aspects, for example, in big difference between the Georgian literary and spoken language; but, as we know, this fact has not become the object of special study or even the theoretical speculation yet. We think that this conflict significantly determines many difficulties suffered by the present Georgia.

The exhaustive analysis of the said psychological conflict exceeds the frames of this article. We

may indicate only that this conflict shall not be identified of the so called "dual moral" phenomenon, that has often been attributed to a "Homo Sovieticus". Here they imply the declaration of loyalty to the official Soviet values and, concurrently, the behavior actually contradicting those values. The difference is that in the present Georgia culture surrounding the public values have no status of an inviolable dogma the violation of which arises, as it was in the Soviet period, the acute reaction and serious sanctions of ideological and enforceable structures. In other words, the public sphere in Georgia is a source of not fear (or caution) but of anxiety. As it is known, there are determined the personal fear which is a concrete one, and the anxiety, the reason of which is not defined (e.g. Freedman et al, 1972, p.13). In our case the source of anxiety shall be the shortage of skills of public behavior.

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