International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN)

Two presidents that came to power under the sign of change meet January 30th. Below are some thoughts elicited by my friend Ambassador K.S. Yalowitz’s letter, writes George Khutsishvili, director of the International Center on Conflict and Negotiation.

We live in the election year 2012, and I belong to those who believe change is needed, and the alternative exists. Yet is the change possible in a country where all branches of power, information and resources are controlled by one power vertical, the ruling team insists it is unchangeable, and the silent majority’s voice is accounted to the administrative majority? Looking back, we see that similar hopes, questions and doubts existed in the election year 2003, but the peaceful revolution happened. What could have dramatically clicked within a few days in a skeptical society’ mind, where everyone was supposed to know everything about anyone else? The turning point that had made November 23 possible was created by the opposition media who demonstrated the effects of (a) virtual critical mass of popular support, and (b) virtual US support for the change. Both supportive factors existed – along with others – but not to an overwhelming extent the media effect forged. However, as the TV bell rang, the words were made flesh, and people believed things somehow had to end as they did.

Just a couple of years ago we could relatively easily travel to Tskhinvali to visit our friends, and they would visit us in Tbilisi even more often. Earlier, until the summer of 2004, we could organize a training, a seminar or cultural event in Tskinvali for the local population, or invite them to Tbilisi or other Georgian cities. The Ossetians also were active and creative. Now it feels like all that was in a dream. We went through another cycle of violence, hatred and isolation.

Die jüngste Eskalation im seit langem schwelenden Konflikt zwischen Georgien und Russland um das von Georgien beanspruchte, mehrheitlich von Russen bewohnte Südossetien hat weltweit für Bestürzung gesorgt. Nachdem georgische Truppen einen Großteil Südossetiens besetzt hatten, schickte das Moskauer Verteidungsministerium Panzerkolonnen in Richtung der umkämpften Hauptstadt Zchinwali. Die Gewalt hätte verhindert werden können, wären früh genug direkte Verhandlungen aufgenommen worden, sagt der Tifliser Friedensaktivist George Khutsishvili im Interview mit derStandard.at.

Russian leaders qualified their military operation in Georgia in August 2008 as “a reaction to the Georgian aggression against South Ossetia”. What they have never mention is that the same Russia – along with the entire international community - adhered to recognition of territorial integrity of Georgia - including Abkhazia and South Ossetia - in all post-Soviet years; basing on which logic, the Georgian attempt to regain Tskhinvali by force qualifies as a disproportionate use of violence by the state towards its own insurgent province, while “aggression” usually pertains to actions towards a different state. This is said in order to stay just, not to justify violence.

Since the start of the crisis, a new informational war has been spiralled across the huge media space controlled or influenced by Russia. Russian media sources reiterated the official version of events: Georgians have launched an unprovoked surprise attack on South-Ossetian city of Tskhinvali which has destroyed the city completely, killed around 2000 civilians, and made the rest flee from the area.